By Madote,
There is this lingering
misconception among Ethiopians and a
few regional analysts that Eritrea was
financially gaining from Ethiopia when
it used the port of Assab between
1991-1997. They also believe the
port’s economic viability hinges on
whether Ethiopia uses it at a future
date.
These narratives are even more prevalent among the so-called opposition. For
example, Awate.com, an Ethiopian-backed extremist website, said:
“For Asseb to make any significance as a source of revenue for Eritrea,
it has tosell its services to its neighborhood customers. Djibouti doesn’t
need that service, Sudan doesn’t. Somalia, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and
anyone and his stepfather doesn’t need that service. Ethiopia does and
it is not buying that service.”
Similarly, In 2000, Meles Zenawi, the late Ethiopian Prime Minister, said:
“So if we use the Port of Assab, the benefit is not only for us, but for
Eritrea, too. On the other hand, if we decide against using Assab, then
the fate of Assab would remain to be a mere source of drinking water
for camels. I made this clear to the diplomats. No more, no less. If we
do not use the port of Assab, then the Eritrean government won’t get a
single cent from Assab.”
Both these quotes suggest Eritrea needs Ethiopia to use its ports as a source of
revenue or else, as Meles puts it, it will be a mere source of drinking water for
camels. Ignoring the fact that animals can not drink sea water, Meles’ point is
simple: without Ethiopia, Assab port will be nothing. But is this claim accurate?
Not quite.
When we compare the year Ethiopia stopped using Eritrea’s port (1998) with the
year it used it (1997), we only see a 48% decline in the number of vessels docking in
the port of Assab, which isn’t bad when you take into consideration Eritrea’s small
population, and the fact that Assab is not the country’s main port.
As a result of the conflict, activity at Assab port declined markedly:
some 322 vessels docked at the port in 1998, compared with 628 in the
There is this lingering
misconception among Ethiopians and a
financially gaining from Ethiopia when
it used the port of Assab between
1991-1997. They also believe the
port’s economic viability hinges on
whether Ethiopia uses it at a future
date.
These narratives are even more prevalent among the so-called opposition. For
example, Awate.com, an Ethiopian-backed extremist website, said:
“For Asseb to make any significance as a source of revenue for Eritrea,
it has tosell its services to its neighborhood customers. Djibouti doesn’t
need that service, Sudan doesn’t. Somalia, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and
anyone and his stepfather doesn’t need that service. Ethiopia does and
it is not buying that service.”
Similarly, In 2000, Meles Zenawi, the late Ethiopian Prime Minister, said:
“So if we use the Port of Assab, the benefit is not only for us, but for
Eritrea, too. On the other hand, if we decide against using Assab, then
the fate of Assab would remain to be a mere source of drinking water
for camels. I made this clear to the diplomats. No more, no less. If we
do not use the port of Assab, then the Eritrean government won’t get a
single cent from Assab.”
Both these quotes suggest Eritrea needs Ethiopia to use its ports as a source of
revenue or else, as Meles puts it, it will be a mere source of drinking water for
camels. Ignoring the fact that animals can not drink sea water, Meles’ point is
simple: without Ethiopia, Assab port will be nothing. But is this claim accurate?
Not quite.
When we compare the year Ethiopia stopped using Eritrea’s port (1998) with the
year it used it (1997), we only see a 48% decline in the number of vessels docking in
the port of Assab, which isn’t bad when you take into consideration Eritrea’s small
population, and the fact that Assab is not the country’s main port.
As a result of the conflict, activity at Assab port declined markedly:
some 322 vessels docked at the port in 1998, compared with 628 in the
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